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  ABSTRACT 
 
Even before the pandemic, an ageing population, a potential over-reliance on 
corporation tax receipts and an inevitable decline in motor tax revenues combined 
to make the need for future tax rises likely. This paper examines a range of options 
that a government seeking to raise or replace tax revenues might consider, 
assessing what is known about how much they would raise, who would bear the 









The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has seen government expenditure rise 
substantially, from €87.2 billion in 2019 to €105.9 billion in 2020, and a forecasted 
€109.2 billion in 2021.1 This has been used by the Government to provide extensive 
supports to individuals and businesses affected by the public health measures 
required to suppress the spread of the virus, facilitated by low-interest rates which 
are in part the product of the interventions staged by the European Central Bank 
(Allen-Coghlan et al., 2020). Temporary deficit-financed increases in spending are 
the appropriate fiscal response to an event of this nature and, as argued by the 
OECD (2021) and the IMF (2021a) among others, should not be withdrawn 
prematurely through reductions in spending or increases in taxation in the short 
run.  
 
However, both the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council (2020a) and Conefrey et al. (2021) 
have highlighted substantial, permanent increases in non-COVID-related spending 
of more than €5 billion in Budget 2021. This comes on top of commitments made 
to reform the health system and expand social welfare entitlements (Government 
of Ireland, 2020) which – as argued by the IMF (2021c) – are likely to require further 
substantial, permanent spending increases in the years ahead. So too will 
maintaining the existing level of public services and the state pension in the face 
of an ageing population, with the share of those aged 65+ forecast to rise from 
14 per cent in 2020 to almost 28 per cent by 2050 (IFAC, 2020b).  
 
Such substantial, permanent increases in spending cannot – even at ultra-low 
interest rates – be sustainably financed in the medium-to-long run through higher 
deficits, but instead require reductions in other expenditure or increases in 
government revenue (Barnes et al., 2021). Yet it is difficult to envisage expenditure 
cuts of the magnitude that would be required to finance these longer-run spending 
pressures given the commitments made by all major parties in the 2020 general 
election to protect many areas of existing spending while increasing others.2 It 
therefore seems likely that there will be some need for sizeable tax increases in 
the years ahead.  
 
This need is made more pressing by structural deficiencies in the revenue base. 




1  See Table 11 in Budget 2021 Economic and Fiscal Outlook, available at http://budget.gov.ie.  
2  See the Irish Election Manifesto Archive available at http://michaelpidgeon.com/manifestos/election.html.   
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volatile corporation tax receipts, heavily concentrated among just a small number 
of firms.3 In addition, the planned shift towards electric vehicles puts at risk more 
than €3 billion per year of taxes related to motoring which are closely linked to the 
carbon dioxide emissions of vehicles.4 
 
This paper sets out a range of options that a future government seeking to raise or 
replace tax revenues might consider, providing a brief review of each tax and the 
potential economic and distributional impact of reforming it. In doing so, it does 
not seek to advocate any particular tax-raising measure as ultimately those are 
political decisions which depend on a government’s distributional goals, value 
judgements and wider priorities. Rather, it seeks to provide evidence for 
policymakers who are in a position to make these decisions.  
 
Since we are interested in measures that would raise revenue in the longer run, we 
use costings from the Office of the Revenue Commissioners (henceforth Revenue) 
and SWITCH, the ESRI tax and benefit microsimulation model, that were collected 
before, and abstract from, the impact of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic on firms 
and households. These are also modelled taking as given the behaviour of 
households and firms. While we discuss the ways in which many of the reforms 
considered might affect behaviour, neither our costings nor those of Revenue take 
account of such responses, or of the wider macroeconomic impacts that higher 
levels of government taxation and spending may have. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines the level and composition 
of government revenues. Section 3 examines increases in broad-based taxes that 
would affect large sections of society. Section 4 focuses on tax increases that would 
primarily affect the better-off, while Section 5 turns to restrictions on tax reliefs 
and exemptions. Section 6 concludes and presents a summary table of the options 






3  See Irish Fiscal Advisory Council (2019), Conefrey et al. (2019), Parliamentary Budget Office (2018), European 
Commission (2020), IMF (2019), McQuinn et al. (2019), Roantree et al. (2018) and Department of Finance (2019b). The 
latest Revenue statistics show that just 10 firms paid 51 per cent of corporation tax receipts in 2020, up from 40 per 
cent in 2019 (Revenue, 2021).  
4  This include Fuel Duties, Motor Tax, Vehicle Registration Tax and carbon tax on auto fuels which Revenue statistics 
show raised a combined €3.5 billion in 2019, the latest year for which figures are available. See 
https://www.revenue.ie/en/corporate/documents/statistics/excise/net-receipts-by-commodity.pdf.  
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SECTION 2 
 
The level and composition of government revenue  
 
Gross current government revenue is expected to reach €77 billion in 2021, 
€3.4 billion higher than its level in 2020 and €2.7 million more than in 2019. This 
amounts to 21.5 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2021, a similar share 
to recent years which Figure 2.1 shows was among the lowest in the OECD. 
However, this comparison is rendered misleading by the contribution the activities 
of multinational corporations make to GDP in Ireland. A more informative 
comparison is yielded by modified Gross National Income (GNI*) which adjusts 
GDP for a number of factors, notably depreciation on foreign-owned intellectual 
property, R&D service imports and aircraft leasing (Honohan, 2021).  
 
Figure 2.1 shows that scaling government revenues by GNI* instead of GDP moves 
Ireland from collecting almost a third less of economic activity in government 
revenue than the average OECD country to a tenth more. While some of this 
revenue is comprised of non-tax sources (e.g. EU structural funds and dividends 
from semi-state companies), the vast majority of it – more than 90 per cent in 
recent years – comes from taxation. 
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FIGURE 2.1 GOVERNMENT REVENUE AS A SHARE OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, 2018 
 
 
Source:  OECD’s Global Revenue Statistics Database, Global revenue statistics database, available at https://stats.oecd.org/. 
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FIGURE 2.2  TAX REVENUE AS A SHARE OF GDP AND GNI* 
 
 
Source:  Table 4, Department of Finance Databank (available at http://databank.finance.gov.ie/BES_Reports.aspx?rep=T4) and CSO 
National Income and Expenditure Tables. 
Notes:  Includes Exchequer tax revenue as well as that from PRSI (including health levies), training levies and Local Property Tax while 
excluding motor vehicle duties. GDP and GNI* series constructed by authors using GDP and ‘Modified gross national income at 
current market prices’ series from 2019 CSO National Income and Expenditure Tables, backcasted using growth in ‘Gross 
domestic product at market prices’ and ‘Gross national income at current market prices’ series respectively, both from the CSO’s 
Historical National Income and Expenditure Tables. 
 
Figure 2.2 plots the evolution of tax revenues as a percentage of GDP and GNI* 
over time and shows that the divergence between the two series has become more 
significant. Although tax revenues as a share of GDP have declined almost 
inexorably from their peak of 34.4 per cent in 1988 to 19.4 per cent in 2019, tax 
revenues as a share of GNI* have fallen only slightly, from an average of 34.3 per 
cent over the 1980s and 1990s to an average of 32.7 per cent in the new 
millennium.  
 
Figure 2.3 plots the composition of tax revenues for the most recently available 
year (2019). This shows that tax revenues in Ireland are drawn from four primary 
sources: 33.1 per cent from income tax (including the Universal Social Charge, 
USC); 21.8 per cent from value-added tax (VAT); 15 per cent from pay-related social 
insurance (PRSI), and 15.7 per cent from corporation tax. Together, these account 
for more than 85.7 per cent – €59.3 billion – of overall tax revenues. Excise duties 







1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
% of GNI* % of GDP
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FIGURE 2.3  COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT TAX REVENUE, 2019 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using figures from the Department of Finance databank. 
Notes:  Total taxes defined as Exchequer taxes plus PRSI (including health levies), training levies and Local Property Tax while excluding 
motor vehicle duties. Other receipts include stamp duty, local property tax and customs. 
Another €3.1 billion of revenues was raised in the form of stamp duties, Capital 
Gains Tax (CGT) and taxes on gifts or bequests (Capital Acquisitions Tax, CAT), 
together accounting for 4.5 per cent of overall tax revenues. The Local Property 
Tax (LPT) raised €473 million in 2019, little more than when introduced in full in 





5  This in part reflects exemption of properties built since 2013 and the continued use of initial valuations, as discussed 
in Section 3.5. 
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SECTION 3 
 
Broad based tax increases 
 
The most straightforward way for any government hoping to raise significant tax 
revenues is to increase the main rates of the four largest taxes: income tax 
(including the USC), PRSI, VAT and corporation tax. In this section we consider the 
distributional and economic effects of such tax increases, alongside similarly 
straightforward increases to excise duties and the LPT, two other sources of 
taxation that affect large sections of society. 
3.1 INCOME TAX AND USC  
Income tax and the USC raised a combined €22.9 billion in 2019. Both are levied 
on a progressive basis, under schedules which subject higher levels of income to 
higher rates of tax. However, the base on which the two taxes are levied differs. 
Income tax is assessed on a joint basis for most married couples compared to an 
individual basis for the USC, which also applies to a broader definition of income 
(including e.g. pension contributions) and with a smaller exempt amount. In 
addition, lower rates of USC apply to those age 70+ or in receipt of a Medical Card.6 
 
Revenue (2020) estimate that a 1 percentage-point increase in all rates of income 
tax would raise €983 million: €664 million from the standard rate (currently 20 per 
cent) and €319 million from the higher rate (currently 40 per cent). A 1 percentage-
point rise in all rates of the USC would generate about €1 billion in revenue: 
€272 million from the lower rate of 0.5 per cent, €203 million from the 2 per cent 
rate, €376 million from the 4.5 per cent rate and €160 million from the 8 per cent 
rate.7  
 
Using SWITCH, Figure 3.1 illustrates the impact of these tax rises across the 
distribution of income, with households divided into 10 equally sized groups 
(deciles) on the basis of their disposable income – that is, after taxes are paid and 
benefits received – adjusted (equivalised) for household size.8 The lines in Figure 
3.1 plot the average loss within each decile from the tax increases as a percentage 




6  See https://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/money_and_tax/tax/income_tax/ for an overview of these taxes.  
7  Revenue’s costing for what increasing the 8 per cent rate of USC would raise includes revenue from raising the 3 per 
cent surcharge on non-PAYE income exceeding €100,000 per year, which we estimate in Section 4.1 amounts to 
c.€15 million. 
8  Appendix I provides further details on the model used to estimate these distributional impacts and some revenue 
yields.  
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USC are broadly progressive, with smaller losses for those in lower- than higher-
income deciles.  
 
However, increases to the standard rate of income tax and the lower (0.5 and 2 per 
cent) rates of the USC affect those in the top two deciles less than others in the top 
half of the income distribution. This is because more of their income is subject to 
the higher rates of income tax and the USC, and therefore the impact of increases 
to the lower rates is smaller. Figure 3.1 also shows that increases to these higher 
rates of income tax and the USC are unambiguously and strongly progressive, with 
losses for those in the highest-income decile (at 0.8 per cent and 0.4 per cent of 
disposable income respectively) larger than for any other decile.  
 




Source:  Authors’ calculations using SWITCH v3.1 run on data from the 2017 Survey of Income and Living Conditions 
(SILC), updated to 2020 terms using outturn and forecast wage growth from the ESRI and Central Bank of 
Ireland. 
Note: Deciles calculated on the basis of equivalised disposable income using CSO national equivalence scales.  
 
All these tax increases can be expected to affect financial incentives to work, 
though the effect on behaviour is theoretically ambiguous. Raising marginal rates 
of tax on work lowers the reward from additional after-tax earnings due to the 














Decile of equivalised disposable income
Income tax: standard rate Income tax: higher rate USC: 0.5% rate
USC: 2% rate USC: 4.5% rate USC: 8% rate
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reduces the opportunity cost of leisure, which will tend to reduce the labour 
supplied by those facing a higher marginal rate (the substitution effect). However, 
affected workers may also want to work more in order to obtain the same standard 
of living because of their decreased after-tax income (the income effect). A large 
body of empirical evidence has shown that the substitution effect typically 
dominates the income effect, suggesting that the likely economic effect of these 
tax increases would be to lead to some reduction in the labour supply of affected 
workers (Blundell and Macurdy, 1999; Keane, 2011; Meghir and Phillips, 2011).  
 
While evidence is more limited on the magnitude of these responses in Ireland, 
Acheson et al. (2018) find that estimates of responsiveness (with an elasticity of 
taxable income of 0.168) here are in the bottom half of the range internationally. 
However, in keeping with this international literature, they also find that higher-
earning and self-assessed taxpayers are much more responsive to taxes than 
lower-earning and PAYE taxpayers, in part because – as we discuss in Sections 4.3 
and 5.4 – they have a greater ability to switch the form in which their income is 
taken (e.g. to capital gains). This suggests that the more progressive measures 
presented in Figure 3.1 are also likely to result in larger behavioural responses, 
raising an equity-efficiency trade-off that is common in many areas of public 
finance.  
 
Increases in income tax and USC will also affect the incentive to save. Both taxes 
apply to most forms of income, including that from investment. Increasing their 
marginal rates can therefore be expected to discourage saving by reducing the net-
of-tax return. Increasing income tax and the USC will also incentivise forms of 
savings that are more tax-favoured such as pension savings, which are exempt 
from income tax up to an annual and lifetime limit although they continue to be 
subject to USC (see the discussion in Section 5.3). However, we are not aware of 
any evidence on how responsive savings decisions are to tax rates in Ireland, so the 
magnitude of such behavioural responses is highly uncertain.  
3.2 PRSI 
PRSI raised more than €10 billion in 2019. It is levied on the earnings of employees 
and the self-employed at rates that depend on the level of earnings and occupation 
of the worker. While receipts are nominally paid into the Social Insurance Fund 
(SIF) to finance certain social welfare payments, in years when its balance was not 
sufficient to do so it has been topped up from general taxation, while in years when 
contributions exceeded payments the surplus was saved in an investment fund 
(Meaney, 2015). PRSI receipts are therefore better considered a supplementary 
tax on earnings than continental European-style social insurance contributions. 
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We estimate that a percentage-point rise in the main rates of Class A employee 
PRSI and Class S self-employed PRSI would raise approximately €700 million and 
€110 million respectively.9 Costings from Revenue estimate that a percentage-
point increase in the main Class A rate of employer PRSI would raise about €850 
million.10  
 
Figure 3.2 shows the distributional impact of these increases to employee and self-
employed PRSI. Again, these are both broadly progressive, raising more as a share 
of disposable income from higher- than lower-income households. For example, a 
1 percentage-point increase in the main Class A rate of employee PRSI would result 
in losses of more than 1 per cent of disposable income for those in the highest 
three income deciles compared to less than 0.4 per cent for those in the lowest 
three income deciles. However, those in the second and third lowest income 
deciles would on average see slightly smaller losses than those in the very lowest 
income decile, as these deciles contain a larger share of adults above the state 
pension age who are not subject to PRSI on their income.  
 
FIGURE 3.2  DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF A 1 PPT INCREASE IN MAIN RATES OF PRSI 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using SWITCH v3.1, run on data from the 2017 Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC), updated to 
2020 terms using outturn and forecast wage growth from the ESRI and Central Bank of Ireland. 





9  These estimates are produced using SWITCH, run on SILC data as outlined in Appendix I.  
10  This costing was provided by the Department of Finance (2020) in advance of Budget 2021, Labour Party Costings, and 















Decile of equivalised disposable income
Employee's PRSI Self employed's PRSI
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Figure 3.2 does not display the distributional impact of an increase to Class A 
employer PRSI. This is because we assume that the initial short-run incidence of 
this tax falls in line with its statutory burden on employers, a proposition for which 
there is good empirical evidence (e.g. Adam et al., 2019). However, much of the 
increase is likely to be passed on over time to workers through lower wages or 
employment – possibly leading to lower tax receipts – and to consumers through 
increased prices (Gruber, 1997; Anderson and Meyer, 1997; Anderson and Meyer, 
2000). Given this, the longer-run distributional impact of employer PRSI is probably 
best thought of as being similar to (if not the same as) employee PRSI. 
 
As with increases to rates of income tax and USC, raising PRSI would affect financial 
incentives to work and save. Acheson et al. (2018) find that PAYE workers – the 
vast majority of those subject to Class A employee PRSI – are far less responsive to 
these incentives than self-employed workers. Thus behavioural responses to an 
increase in Class A PRSI are likely to be smaller than to those in Class S (self-
employed) PRSI or the rates of income tax and USC discussed above.  
 
However, increasing rates of PRSI would also have very different impacts across 
generations as would increasing rates of income tax or the USC. This is because 
PRSI is not levied on the income – even earnings – of those above the age of 65. As 
a result, while the burden of increasing income tax or the USC would be borne by 
both younger and older generations, extra revenue raised from increased rates of 
PRSI would be collected from younger generations. 
3.3 VAT 
VAT raised €15.1 billion in 2019. It is levied at a standard rate of 23 per cent and 
reduced rates of 13.5 per cent and 9 per cent. In addition, a wide range of goods 
are subject to a zero per cent rate or exempt from VAT entirely (with VAT on inputs 
to the latter not reclaimable from government). Revenue (2020) estimate that a 
1 percentage-point increase in the standard and reduced rates of VAT would raise 
€690 million of additional revenue: €440 million from an increase in the standard 
rate of 23 per cent and €250 from a rise in the reduced rates of 13.5 per cent and 
9 per cent.  
 
As shown in Figure 3.2, such increases in VAT would be regressive with respect to 
income. A 1 percentage-point increase of both VAT rates would result in losses of 
0.7 per cent of disposable income for the lowest-income decile compared to a 0.25 
per cent loss for those in the highest-income decile. This is because low-income 
households on average spend a lot relative to their incomes and therefore pay a 
lot of VAT at any given point in time. However, looking at losses from an indirect 
tax rise as a proportion of income can give a misleading impression (Mirrlees, 
2011). Households cannot spend more than their income indefinitely, as over a 
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lifetime income and expenditure must equal except for bequests and the 
possibility of dying in debt. Large losses as a share of income arise because of 
households experiencing temporary periods of low income but borrowing or 
drawing down savings to maintain their levels of consumption (Brewer et al., 
2017).11 Nevertheless, for these households, an increase in VAT could constitute a 
particular burden. 
 
When looked at as a percentage of expenditure, as suggested by Mirrlees (2011), 
the distributional pattern is less clear. The additional tax burden for most 
households is similar across the distribution of income. Households in the lowest 
two income deciles are no more affected by an increase in the standard rate of VAT 
than households on average, but those in the highest two income deciles are 
slightly less affected. The distributional impact of an increase in the reduced rate 
of VAT is even flatter, with average losses as a per cent of expenditure varying only 
between 0.16 per cent and 0.18 per cent across deciles. While increases in the main 
rates of VAT might therefore be considered distributional neutral rather than 
regressive, they are not progressive like increases to income tax, the USC and PRSI, 
largely because there is no VAT-free allowance on the first slice of household 





11  Such temporarily low incomes can arise for a variety of reasons including periods of study, unemployment, and 
time out of the labour market to raise children, as well as retirees drawing on past savings.  
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Source:  Authors’ calculations using the 2015–16 Household Budget Survey. 
Notes:  Deciles of household income equivalised, constructed using CSO national equivalence scales. Incomes and expenditures uprated 
to 2020 levels using average hourly earnings and Consumer Price Index growth from the CSO. 
 
Like a rise in income tax, the USC or PRSI, increasing VAT would weaken financial 
work incentives by reducing the value of what can be consumed net-of-tax from 
disposable income (Mirrlees et al., 2011). However, unlike those tax increases, 
raising VAT also reduces the value of out-of-work transfers and pension income, 
which mitigates its impact on financial work incentives. There is also some 
evidence that people are less responsive to less salient taxes such as VAT (Chetty 
et al., 2009).  
 
Raising the standard and reduced rates of VAT would also exacerbate the 
magnitude of the existing bias created by the tax system towards zero-rated, 
reduced-rated and exempt goods. By raising the relative price of standard-rated 
goods, this encourages individuals to buy more of these goods than they would 
under a neutral tax system. As discussed in Section 5.1, Ireland stands out as an 
outlier in Europe in terms of the share of total spending that is subject to these 
zero- and reduced rates, which suggests the scale of the bias is also likely to be 
larger than elsewhere.  
3.4 EXCISE DUTIES  
Excise duties raised €6 billion in 2019. They are levied on the consumption of 
alcoholic beverages, tobacco products and certain fossil fuels (in the form of both 






















Decile of equivalised disposable income
Standard VAT - % of income Reduced VAT - % of income
Standard VAT - % expenditure Reduced VAT - % of expenditure
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are set as a fixed amount per unit of consumption, with different amounts charged 
depending on the specific product (e.g. a different excise duty is charged on a litre 
of beer than on a litre of wine).  
 
Revenue (2020) estimate that a 10 per cent increase in the excise duties on 
alcoholic beverages and tobacco products, together with a similar increase in the 
carbon tax, would raise around 440 million, whereas a 5 per cent increase in the 
excise duties of fuels would yield about €85 million.12   
 
As with VAT, Figure 3.4 shows that increasing alcohol duties is regressive when 
expressed as a share of disposable income but more neutral when done as a share 
of expenditure. The same is not true for increases to tobacco duty, mineral oil tax 
and the carbon tax. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show that each of these tax increases 
remains regressive (if somewhat less so) when expressed as a share of spending. 
The reason for this is that such goods make up a larger share of the spending of 
lower-income households.  
 
Perhaps more than for other taxes, excise duties are motivated by more than just 
raising revenue. Indeed, most are explicitly aimed at changing behaviour and 
encouraging consumers to purchase less of goods that are seen as in some way 
damaging to individuals and/or society at large; what economists called Pigovian 
taxes designed to correct ‘externalities’. From this perspective, the behavioural 
responses induced by raising excise duties might be regarded as less of an issue 
than those associated with higher taxes on personal income.  
 
However, there is a strong argument for setting these taxes at a level determined 
by their cost to society rather than some rate designed to raise a given amount of 
revenue (Diamond, 1973; Griffith et al., 2019). Furthermore, the aim of 
discouraging societally harmful behaviour sits uneasily with that of raising 
additional tax revenue as, to the extent that the taxes are successful in the first 
aim, they will undercut the second. This perhaps leaves excise duties as poorly 
suited to addressing the topic of interest in this paper: raising additional tax 





12  Estimations about additional revenue are from Revenue (2020), scaled to fit the increases simulated. 
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FIGURE 3.4  DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF INCREASES IN ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO EXCISE DUTIES 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using the 2015–16 Household Budget Survey. 
Notes:  Deciles of household income equivalised, constructed using CSO national equivalence scales. Incomes and expenditures uprated 
to 2020 levels using average hourly earnings and Consumer Price Index growth from the CSO. 
 
FIGURE 3.5  DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF INCREASES IN FUEL EXCISE DUTIES AND CARBON TAX 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using the 2015–16 Household Budget Survey. 
Notes:  Deciles of household income equivalised, constructed using CSO national equivalence scales. Incomes and expenditures uprated 
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3.5  CORPORATION TAX 
Receipts from corporation tax amounted to €10.9 billion in 2019, representing 
about 16 per cent of tax revenues. Statistics from Revenue (2021) show that 51 per 
cent of these receipts were paid by just 10 companies, raising concerns about over-
reliance on a potentially volatile source of tax revenues.  
 
This also creates considerable uncertainty around what an increase to the main 
12.5 per cent rate of corporation tax would actually yield, as it is highly dependent 
on the actions of a small number of companies. Research suggests that foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and the decisions of multinationals to locate in Ireland are 
highly sensitive to rates of corporation tax. For example, Conefrey and FitzGerald 
(2011) estimate that the reduction in corporation tax in Ireland from 40 per cent 
in 1994 to 12.5 per cent in 2003 added almost 4 per cent to the level of economic 
output by 2005 and around €2 billion in corporation tax revenues. Lawless et al. 
(2014) simulate that, if the rate of corporation tax were 22.5 per cent instead of 
12.5 per cent, half as many affiliates of multinational corporations would have 
located in Ireland over the period 2005–2012, while Davies et al. (2016) estimate 
that a 1 percentage-point increase in the rate of corporation tax would reduce by 
4.6 per cent the probability of Ireland being chosen as the location for new FDI 
from outside the EU. Largely because of this uncertainty, Revenue – in contrast to 
other major taxes such as income tax, USC and VAT – do not provide any estimate 
of what an increase in corporation tax rates would raise, nor does any other 
available source that we know of. There is a question mark, therefore, over how 
much the government could raise in additional revenue by increasing rates of 
corporation tax.  
 
Leaving aside this question, increasing rates of corporation tax would have impacts 
across a range of economic channels. In addition to multinationals, higher rates of 
corporation tax would affect domestic firms, including small and medium 
enterprises, which accounted for almost two-thirds of employment in 2018.13 
Lawless et al. (2020) estimate that over 80 per cent of these undertook investment 
in fixed assets, intangible assets or staff every year since 2016. Raising the rate of 
corporation tax would reduce the net-of-tax return on (and so the attractiveness 
of) these investments, as well as reducing the availability of internal funds, which 
are the overwhelming source of finance for investments made by domestic firms 
in Ireland (Lawless et al., 2020).  
 
Furthermore, although corporation tax is statutorily levied on the profits of 
businesses, it will ultimately be paid by different groups of people. This includes 




13  See Table BRA08 Business Demography NACE Rev 2, available at https://data.cso.ie/table/BRA08.  
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dividends and capital gains on shares. While such assets are disproportionately 
directly held by higher-income individuals, those with private pensions would also 
be affected given that most funds are at least partly invested in Irish firms. 
However, research from both the United States (e.g. Auerbach, 2006; Suárez 
Serrato and Zidar, 2016) and Europe (Fuest et al., 2018) suggests that a large share 
of the burden of increases to corporation tax is also likely to be borne by workers 
in the form of lower wages. This can arise from (domestic and multinational) firms 
deciding to invest less, leading to lower capital and lower labour productivity and 
wages. Similarly, landowners and consumers are also likely to bear some of the 
burden of higher corporation tax, though research suggests a smaller share than 
for company owners and workers (e.g. Suárez Serrato and Zidar, 2016).   
 
A final consideration in relation to raising corporation tax is the international 
environment. It has long been argued that the responsiveness of multinational 
investment and location decisions limits the ability of governments to raise 
corporation tax rates (e.g. Devereux and Sorensen, 2006; OECD, 2007; Johansson 
et al., 2008). However, there are suggestions that international negotiations 
spearheaded by the OECD may soon lead to an agreement that would impose a 
global minimum corporation tax rate.14 In addition, the UK government has 
recently announced that it will raise its main rate of corporation tax from 19 to 
25 per cent in 2023, while the Biden administration has proposed raising the main 
rate in the USA from 21 to 28 per cent in the coming years.  
 
While these developments may provide more scope – and political pressure – for 
a future government to raise the main rate of corporation tax in Ireland, they are 
also likely to substantially alter the amount of revenue raised by corporation tax. 
Indeed, the Department of Finance (2021b) has made a provisional allowance in its 
latest forecasts for a €2 billion reduction in corporation tax reviews by 2025. 
However, the eventual impact could be much larger or smaller depending on the 
detail of any agreement eventually reached. As a result, there may be arguments 
for leaving the main rate (and structure) of corporation tax unchanged until the 
implications of any international agreement are fully understood. 
3.6  LOCAL PROPERTY TAX (LPT) 
The Local Property Tax (LPT) is levied on the assessed market value of most 
residential properties at a standard rate of 0.18 per cent up to €1,000,000 and 
0.25 per cent on anything above that. It raised €473 million in 2019 – little more 
than when initially introduced in 2013 despite the substantial increase in the value 
of properties on which it is levied (Horan et al., 2021). This reflects both the 




14  See https://www.ft.com/content/847c5f77-f0af-4787-8c8e-070ac6a7c74f, accessed on 9/5/2021.  
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of valuations made in 2013. Statistics from the CSO show that just over 100,000 
new dwellings have been completed since 2013 – around half of which were sold 
to owner-occupiers – and that the average value of properties sold increased by 
75 per cent between 2013 and 2020.15 
 
Revenue from the LPT could most straightforwardly be increased by bringing 
recently built properties into scope and using updated valuations for all properties. 
A recent review of the LPT (Department of Finance, 2019a) estimated that doing 
so in 2019 would have increased LPT revenues by around 55 per cent, raising an 
additional €275 million. While this could lead to sharp increases in tax liabilities for 
some property owners who have seen substantial capital gains in recent years, the 
Government could simultaneously increase the income limits below which one can 
defer the liability – currently set at €25,000 for a full and €35,000 for a partial 
deferral for a couple with no mortgage – if it had concerns about the impacts of 
such a tax rise on ‘asset-rich income-poor’ households.  
 
Efforts to mitigate these impacts by reducing the rates levied in certain bands or 
local authorities would complicate the LPT (leading to over 600 different rates in 
one option considered by the Department of Finance review) and could transform 
it from a progressive tax – with an average rate that is rising in the tax base – to a 
regressive one.   
 
Revenue could also be raised from the LPT by increasing the rates at which the tax 
is levied. Estimates from the Revenue Commissioners suggest that increasing the 
rates by 15 per cent – i.e. the main rate from 0.18 per cent to 0.207 per cent and 
the higher rate from 0.25 per cent to 0.2875 per cent – would raise at least 
€72 million per year, and more if combined with measures to update valuations 
and bring exempted dwellings into scope. 
 
While the burden of higher rates of LPT would fall on current owners in the short 
run, the rates would likely be capitalised into the price of residential property in 
the longer run (Gravelle, 2007).16 As a result, higher rates of LPT would be likely to 
dampen the growth of house prices, particularly that linked to credit growth and 
purchases driven by the anticipation of capital gains. From this perspective, higher 
rates of LPT could have positive effects on financial stability as well as raising 
revenue. In addition, given that the vast majority of household wealth is held in the 
form of residential property (Lyon et al., 2021), the LPT functions as an effective 




15  See CSO series NDA02 (New Dwelling Completions), HPA02 (Residential Dwelling Property Transactions) 
and HPA13 (Residential Property Price Index).  
16  This may be more complicated where rates are set at a hyper-local level and closely linked to the quality and quantity 
of public services, as in the United States. See Oates and Fischel (2016) for a discussion of these issues. 
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SECTION 4 
 
Tax increases on the ‘Better-off’ 
 
A future tax-raising government might decide it would prefer to raise extra revenue 
from those deemed more able to bear an additional burden. Indeed, TDs both 
supporting and opposing the current government have recently suggested that, in 
response to spending pressures arising from the pandemic, taxes should be 
increased on those with higher levels of income or wealth.17 This section therefore 
examines various options for raising revenue from those who might be considered 
better-off in terms of their income or wealth. Throughout the paper, we do not 
seek to advocate any particular measure(s) as ultimately those are political 
decisions which depend on a government’s distributional goals, value judgements 
and wider priorities.  
4.1  INCREASING TOP RATES OF USC 
In addition to the main rates of the USC considered in Section 3.1, a higher 11 per 
cent rate applies to non-PAYE income in excess of €100,000 per year. We estimate 
that increasing this surcharge by 1 percentage-point would raise a modest 
€14 million per year. This, however, is subject to much more uncertainty than 
increases to the other rates of USC – in part because, unlike the Revenue (2020) 
estimates provided for most other tax increases, ours is derived from household 
survey data which is likely to under-record incomes at the very top of the 
distribution (Bollinger et al., 2019). While this may mean the estimated revenue 
yield is understated, economic research – including that for Ireland discussed in 
Section 3.1 (Acheson et al., 2018) – suggests that higher-income and self-employed 
individuals are much more responsive to taxes than lower-income and PAYE 
workers, meaning that our estimate may be significantly overstated.  
 
However, there is strong evidence that this relative responsiveness to taxation is 
driven by the greater opportunities available to the self-employed and company 
owner-managers to – both legally and illegally – avoid taxes (Saez et al., 2012). This 
can involve simply not declaring taxable income on self-assessment returns, which 
Advani (2020) shows is much more likely for self-employed than PAYE workers in 
the UK (more than half of self-employed workers subject to a random audit were 
found to be non-compliant, owing tax amounting to more than 40 per cent of that 





17  See, respectively, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/covid-19-minister-seeks-solidarity-tax-on-high-earners-
and-firms-highly-profitable-in-pandemic-1.4535421 and https://www.thejournal.ie/readme/covid-budget-5234298-
Oct2020 (accessed 05/05/2021).  
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In addition, those who own and manage their own business have more control and 
flexibility to direct profits within their company and realise this income as capital 
gains, which – as we discuss in Sections 4.3 and 5.4 – is subject to much lower rates 
of taxation. Miller et al. (2019) show that this accounts for the entirety of company 
owner-managers’ relative responsiveness to tax in the UK, rather than reductions 
in real business activity. An important implication of this evidence is that higher 
rates of tax – including the USC – could raise more revenue if accompanied by 
measures to restrict reliefs, such as those discussed in Section 5 below. 
 
Nevertheless, the blue series in Figure 4.1 shows that – assuming it elicits no 
behavioural response – the impact of and revenues from such a tax rise would fall 
primarily on those in the very highest income decile. The average loss for 
individuals in this decile amount to 0.07 per cent of disposable income compared 
to less than 0.01 per cent for those in lower-income deciles. This represents a small 
impact for the top decile on average because the tax rise applies only to non-PAYE 
income.  
 
Figure 4.1 also shows the distributional impact of introducing an equivalent 3 per 
cent USC surcharge on PAYE income, which we estimate would raise around 
€110 million per year. This increase would again primarily affect those in the very 
highest income decile, with an average loss of just over 0.50 per cent of disposable 
income, compared to less than 0.10 per cent for others in the top half of the income 
distribution and negligible impacts for those in the bottom half. Potential 
behavioural responses to this tax rise are likely to be smaller than increases to the 
3 per cent USC surcharge, reflecting the fact that PAYE workers have fewer 
opportunities to avoid higher taxes by holding income within an owner-managed 
company or shifting the form in which income is taken. 
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FIGURE 4.1 DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF INCREASES TO HIGHER RATES OF THE USC 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using SWITCH v3.1 run on data from the 2017 Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC), updated to 
2020 terms using outturn and forecast wage growth from the ESRI and Central Bank of Ireland. 
Note: Deciles calculated on the basis of equivalised disposable income, using CSO national equivalence scales.  
 
4.2  INCREASING INCOME TAX RATES ON HIGHER EARNERS 
Extra tax revenue could also be raised by increasing rates of income tax on higher 
earners. Previous governments have considered removing the PAYE and Earned 
Income tax credits – which reduce final income tax liabilities – from taxpayers with 
incomes above €100,000 per year (Department of Finance, 2019b). Withdrawing 
these tax credits would further complicate what is already quite a convoluted tax 
schedule, shown in Figure 4.2 for the PAYE employment earnings of a single adult 
without children.  
 
The effective marginal tax rate from income tax, the USC and class A (employee 
and employer) PRSI rises sharply at around €20,000 of gross annual income. This is 
because individuals face the standard 20 per cent rate of income tax from €16,500 
per year while individuals’ class A PRSI credit is withdrawn at a rate of 1/6 on top 
of income tax, PRSI and the 4.5 per cent rate of USC from €18,304 per year. This 
gives rise to an effective marginal rate of just over 50 per cent for a short range of 
income at around €22,000 per year, which falls back down to 35.6 per cent before 
again rising to more than 50 per cent with the higher rates of income tax and USC, 
at around €33,000 and €70,000 per year respectively. Withdrawing PAYE and 
Earned Income tax credits at the previously proposed rate of 5 per cent from those 
with taxable income above €100,000 would create an effective rate of 64.2 per 
cent between €100,000 and €120,000 per year, shown by the dotted line in 




















Decile of equivalised disposable income
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FIGURE 4.2  TAX SCHEDULE ON PAYE INCOME FOR SINGLE ADULT WITHOUT CHILDREN, 2021  
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
Notes:  Assumes single adult (no children) with PAYE income only, paying class A PRSI. Ignores infinite marginal rates created by discrete 
jumps (‘notches’) in USC and PRSI schedules. 
 
A more straightforward and transparent way to increase income tax on higher 
earners would be to introduce a new rate of income tax from €100,000. Revenue 
(2020) estimate that a new 43 per cent rate would raise around €315 million per 
year and – as shown in Figure 4.3 – primarily affect those near the top of the 
income distribution, with an average loss of 0.84 per cent of disposable income for 
those in the highest-income decile. However, such a tax rise would be less 
progressive than an analogous increase to the USC as income tax is levied on the 
joint income of most married couples. As a result, more people would pay the 
additional rate of income tax than would pay the new rate of USC considered 
above.  
 
The joint nature of income tax also means that the extent of behavioural responses 
might be more substantial than to analogous increases in the USC. This is because 
some second-earners – predominantly women – would also be affected by the tax 
increase. The empirical literature shows that this group is typically more responsive 
to financial incentives than primary earners, both at the intensive and extensive 
margins (Meghir and Phillips, 2010). Furthermore, Doorley (2019) showed that 
previous reforms to income tax that primarily affected women induced substantial 
behavioural responses. It is therefore likely that behavioural responses would 
reduce the yield from a new rate of income tax above €100,000, though to what 
extent – and whether this would be materially offset by the underreporting of high 
incomes in our survey data – is uncertain. However, as with increases to the USC, 
it is also likely that more revenue could be raised if accompanied by measures to 
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FIGURE 4.3 DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF NEW 43 PER CENT RATE OF INCOME TAX ABOVE €100,000 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using SWITCH v3.1 run on data from the 2017 Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC), updated to 
2020 terms using outturn and forecast wage growth from the ESRI and Central Bank of Ireland. 
Note: Deciles calculated on the basis of equivalised disposable income, using CSO national equivalence scales.  
 
4.3  CAPITAL GAINS TAX (CGT) 
CGT is a tax charged on the increase in value of an asset between its acquisition 
and disposal. It raised just over €1 billion in 2019, three times its yield in 2009. This 
reflects the cyclical and volatile nature of receipts, which Revenue statistics show 
are also highly concentrated among a small number of taxpayers realising very 
large gains: almost €500 million was raised from just 527 taxpayers reporting 
chargeable gains of more than €1 million each. The first €1,270 of gains in any year 
are exempt from CGT; gains above that amount are taxed at 33 per cent.  
 
Revenue (2020) estimate that increasing the rate of CGT from 33 to 34 per cent 
would raise €33 million per year, although this estimate is highly uncertain given 
the volatile and concentrated nature of CGT receipts.18 There is evidence that 
capital gains realisations are quite sensitive to tax rates (e.g. Dowd and McClelland, 
2019; Miller et al., 2019; Lavecchia and Tazhitdinova, 2021), which has prompted 
some to propose temporary or permanent reductions in CGT to try to stimulate 
economic activity and investment (e.g. Department of Finance, 2018).  
 
However, while research finds that the realisation of capital gains might be very 
responsive to tax rates (especially in the short run), it also finds that investment is 
not. Instead, company owner-managers appear to respond to reduced rates of CGT 
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2019). This suggests that higher rates of CGT might be more likely to raise revenue 
if accompanied by measures to remove or restrict some of the significant reliefs 
that are discussed in Section 5.4, such as entrepreneurs’ or retirement relief. 
 
Nevertheless, raising rates of CGT would reduce the incentive to save and invest. 
It would also exacerbate existing distortions if done without reforming the base on 
which the tax is currently levied. For example, because CGT is only charged when 
gains are realised, individuals holding assets whose value has increased are 
artificially discouraged from disposing of these. Mirrlees et al. (2011, pp.285-346) 
proposed addressing these issues – and other anomalies in the taxation of savings 
– by introducing a rate-of-return allowance (RRA) for holdings of shares and similar 
assets, as exists in Norway. This would effectively provide a tax-free allowance 
equal in value to the normal (‘risk-free’) rate of return on the purchase cost of an 
asset, which could be deducted from actual returns, with any remaining ‘excess’ 
returns subject to full taxation. Such a system would eliminate disincentives to save 
and tax-induced distortions to the form that saving takes, while simultaneously 
capturing a share of any above-normal or ‘excess’ returns. 
 
It would also allow for the equal treatment of capital gains and cash income, which 
currently have separate allowances and rates for reasons that are hard to justify. 
The effect of this is to leave better-off taxpayers whose income comes exclusively 
from employment or rental income subject to a higher effective tax rate than those 
with the same income but from both employment and capital gains. Conversely, 
the differential treatment encourages those with lower levels of income to take 
that in the form of earnings rather than capital gains.  
 
This treatment inhibits the ability of government to raise income tax revenues from 
higher earners, given the ability of company owner-managers to convert income 
into capital gains. For these reasons, Adam and Miller (2021) and the Office for Tax 
Simplification (2020), among others, have proposed aligning the rates of tax on 
capital gains with those on employment income in the UK.19 Harmonising the 
treatment of these different income sources would provide more scope for a 
future tax-raising government to increase not only rates of CGT, but rates of 
income tax and USC too.  
4.4  CAPITAL ACQUISITIONS TAX (CAT) 
Capital Acquisitions Tax (CAT) is paid on the value of inheritances or gifts received. 
It is levied at a rate of 33 per cent on the amount that exceeds a lifetime threshold 




19  In an Irish context, such alignment would also need to take account of Deposit Interest Retention Tax (DIRT) and Life 
Assurance Exit Tax (LAET).   
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beneficiary) and the person who gives it (the disponer). A threshold of €335,000 
applies in cases where the beneficiary is the child of the disponer or a parent who 
takes full and complete ownership of the inheritance (Group A). A threshold of 
€32,500 applies when the beneficiary is the parent (in cases of limited interest), 
the grandparent, the grandchild, sibling or nephew/niece of the disponer (Group 
B). A threshold of €16,250 applies to any other relationship (Group C), with the 
exception that, if the disposer is the beneficiary’s spouse or civil partner, the 
inheritance or gift is exempt from CAT.20 
 
CAT raised a little over €500 million from just 16,000 payees in 2019. Less than 
€60 million of these receipts came from the taxation of inter vivos gifts. The vast 
bulk of revenue arose from 14,500 payments of CAT on the receipt of 
inheritances.21 Since, on average, more than one beneficiary is associated with 
each estate and that the number of deaths has exceeded 30,000 per year in recent 
years, this implies that far less than half of deaths were associated with an 
inheritance that led to a CAT liability.22 Revenue statistics also show that the 
average Group A CAT liability in 2019 was €85,605, which implies that the average 
Group A taxpayer has received almost €600,000 of inheritance or gifts from their 
parents (or children) over their lifetime. Using earlier data from the 2013 
Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS), Lawless and Lynch (2017) 
show that fewer than 40 per cent of households had received or expected to 
receive a gift or inheritance. In short, CAT is a tax primarily paid by a small number 
of individuals receiving large bequests or gifts.  
 
Revenue (2020) estimate that increasing the rate of CAT by 1 percentage-point 
would yield €13 million in extra revenue, a relatively small amount that reflects the 
exemption of most gifts and inheritances. Reducing these group thresholds could 
yield more significant amounts of revenue: €63 million from reducing the Class A 
threshold to €250,000 (its level until 2012); €20 million from reducing the Class B 
threshold to €25,000, and a mere €3 million from reducing the Class C threshold to 
€13,000.  
 
Such increases in CAT would not have the same negative impacts on financial 
incentives to work as increases in taxes on labour or to invest as increases in CGT. 
Indeed, economic theory suggests that the receipt or even expectation of bequests 
acts to reduce labour supply, suggesting that increases in CAT may have a positive 
impact on the employment and hours worked of beneficiaries. Research on this 




20  There also exist numerous CAT exemptions and reliefs which we discuss in Section 5.5. 
21  See https://www.revenue.ie/en/corporate/documents/statistics/receipts/cat-receipts.pdf. 
22  According to the CSO Vital Statistics, there were 31,134 deaths in Ireland in 2019, 
https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-vsys/vitalstatisticsyearlysummary2019/. 
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al. (2020) estimate that an additional Euro of bequest tax revenue in Germany 
would generate an additional 9 cents of labour income tax revenue in present value 
terms through higher labour supply of heirs, Doorley and Pestel (2020) – who also 
examine Germany – find more limited effects. Brown et al. (2010) find that 
bequests are positively correlated with the probability of early retirement in the 
USA, especially when the inheritance is unexpected and large. This suggests that 
another channel that higher CAT might operate through is delaying the retirement 
of those who would otherwise receive larger bequests or inheritances.  
4.5 WEALTH TAX 
An obvious way of raising additional revenue from the better-off would be to levy 
a tax on the stock of accumulated wealth. As is the case internationally, wealth is 
highly unequally distributed in Ireland. Figures from the HFCS show that 50 per 
cent of the total in 2018 – estimated to amount to €667.4 billion – was held by the 
top 10 per cent of households (Horan et al., 2020). This suggests that a recurrent 
tax levied on wealth could raise substantial amounts of revenue.  
 
However, the same data shows that the vast majority of household wealth – about 
60 per cent – is held in the form of households’ main residence, and another 30 per 
cent made up by other property. Property holdings are also the most important 
source of wealth for the wealthiest fifth of households; only around 10 per cent of 
assets are held in another form. Thus most household wealth – including that of 
the wealthiest – is already subject to tax in the form of the LPT (which as discussed 
in Section 3.6 is levied at a higher rate on properties worth more than €1 million).  
 
Furthermore, using an earlier (2013) edition of the HFCS, Lawless and Lynch (2018) 
show that, to raise significant revenue, a wealth tax would have to contain few 
exemptions and apply from a relatively low level of wealth. For example, they show 
that a tax at the rate of 1 per cent which applied to wealth in excess of €1 million 
for a single adult (double that for a couple), and excluded principal private 
residences, farms, businesses and pensions, would raise just €53 million from only 
4,000 (0.25 per cent of) households. Applying the tax to wealth above the same 
threshold but removing these exemptions would raise €248 million from 26,000 
(1.5 per cent of) households, while applying the tax with the same exemptions but 
from a lower level (€125,000 for a single adult and €250,000 for a couple) would 
raise €329 million from 96,000 (6 per cent of) households. While aggregate wealth 
holdings have increased significantly since 2013 (most notably because of an 
increase in house prices), these broad patterns will continue to hold: that is, a 
wealth tax will need to apply from a low level, with few exemptions, if it is to raise 
substantial revenues.  
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Lawless and Lynch (2018) also show that, although the bulk of tax revenue would 
be raised from households who have both high levels of income and high levels of 
wealth, tax liabilities under the latter two scenarios would, on average, amount to 
more than 15 per cent of gross income per year for the lowest-income tenth of 
households. While the disproportionate impact of a recurrent wealth tax on such 
groups could be mitigated with a maximum payment cap, such a measure would 
reduce revenues significantly and introduce a strong disincentive for those in 
households affected by the cap to increase their income.23 
 
A recurrent wealth tax would also have other important economic impacts. If it 
included significant exemptions, it would create – or exacerbate existing – 
distortions to save in a tax-favoured form. This could have particularly pronounced 
effects in the case of owner-occupied housing, which is already subject to tax-
favoured treatment through, for example, its exemption from CGT (discussed in 
Section 5.4 below). Bestowing further tax-advantaged status would be likely to 
increase demand for and thus the price of owner-occupied housing, which could 
undercut the Central Bank of Ireland efforts to dampen house price volatility (Kelly 
et al., 2018; McQuinn, 2021).  
 
In addition, Adam et al. (2013) argue that a recurrent tax on stocks of wealth is 
inferior to one raising the same revenue on the returns from these stocks, because 
it imposes a higher rate on assets that yield lower returns. Such preferential 
treatment of ‘excess’ returns to saving is difficult to justify given both that high-
return assets are precisely the type that will continue to be in demand even if more 
heavily taxed (making the tax less distortionary) and that high-return assets are 
more likely to be held by wealthier households (Fagereng et al., 2016, 2020). 
 
As Adam and Miller (2020) argue in their contribution to the UK Wealth Tax 
Commission (Advani et al., 2020), there is a far more convincing economic rationale 
for a once-off tax on wealth. If credibly once-off and levied on a measure of wealth 
that was fixed before the tax was announced (or expected), such a tax would – like 
any other retrospective windfall tax – have no effect on people’s behaviour and 
therefore generate no economic inefficiency.  
 
However, it would be difficult for any government introducing such a tax to 
credibly commit to it being once-off (particularly given the experience of the 




23  Consider a PAYE worker with annual earnings of €50,000 per year in a household benefiting from a payment cap 
of the kind suggested by Lawless and Lynch (2018), set at 33 per cent of gross income. They would keep only 18.5 cent of 
any additional euro in gross earnings because of the interaction of the payment cap with rates of income tax (40 per cent), 
the USC (4.5 per cent) and PRSI (4 per cent).   
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then extended through to 2016, with some discussion of it becoming a permanent 
feature).24 People might as a result respond by saving less and holding wealth in 
forms less likely to be taxed in the future. In addition, a once-off wealth tax would 
still raise complex problems in relation to the valuation of assets (Emmerson et al., 
2010) and would not address the issues motivating this section: the need for 
permanent increases in tax revenue to replace existing sources in terminal decline 





24  See O’Donovan (2020) for a discussion of this and the history of other once-off wealth taxes. 
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SECTION 5 
 
Restricting reliefs and exemptions 
 
In addition to the broad-based tax rises considered in Section 3 and tax increases 
for the ‘better-off’ examined in Section 4, a future government could decide to 
restrict some of the reliefs and exemptions that apply to these taxes. There are a 
large number of such reliefs and exemptions, as illustrated by the twenty-page list 
contained in a recent Department of Finance (2020a) report on tax expenditures, 
many well targeted at achieving legitimate policy aims. We focus attention here on 
some of the larger reliefs that have a more questionable underlying economic 
rationale or are poorly targeted at achieving their stated aims. 
5.1  STANDARDISING RATES OF VAT 
With the departure of the UK from the EU, Ireland is now the only European Union 
country that applies a zero rate of VAT to a large share of spending (Adam et al., 
2011). In addition, a comparatively large share of expenditure is subject to reduced 
rates of VAT, notably heating fuels, building and many hospitality and tourism-
related services. Revenue (2020) estimate that increasing the zero and reduced 
rates of VAT to the standard rate of 23 per cent could raise €2.2 billion and 
€2.4 billion per year respectively. 
 
Figure 5.1 shows that increasing these zero and reduced rates of VAT to 23 per cent 
would result in larger losses as share of disposable income for lower-income than 
higher-income households. However, as argued in Section 3.3, this can present a 
misleading impression because households experiencing temporary periods out of 
work typically spend a lot relative to their incomes at any given point in time, but 
cannot do so indefinitely.  
 
When examined relative to expenditure (which provides a better measure of 
longer-run or lifetime income), increasing reduced rates of VAT is close to 
distributionally neutral, but increasing VAT on items that are currently zero-rated 
is regressive with respect to spending. This is because items subject to the zero 
rate of VAT – such as books, children’s clothing and many types of food and drink 
– make up a larger share of spending for low-income households. The reverse is 
true for many items subject to the reduced rates of VAT, in particular hospitality 
and tourism-related services (Coffey et al., 2020). However, this does not result in 
a progressive distributional pattern when expressed as a share of spending 
because reduced rates of VAT also apply to heating fuels and electricity, which 
make up a larger share of the spending of lower-income households. 
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FIGURE 5.1 DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF EQUALISING ALL VAT RATES WITH THE MAIN VAT RATE 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using the 2015-2016 Household Budget Survey. 
Notes:  Deciles of household income equivalised, constructed using CSO national equivalence scales. Incomes and expenditures uprated 
to 2020 levels using average hourly earnings and Consumer Price Index growth from the CSO. 
 
Nevertheless, such tax increases would amount to about 3.5 per cent of household 
income on average if spending patterns did not respond – a significant tax increase 
for all households. However, because they spend far more in cash terms, the vast 
majority of revenue raised from the tax increase would be from higher-income 
households. As a result, it would be possible to spend some of the additional 
revenue from the tax rise to compensate lower-income households while still 
raising substantial amounts of revenue. Indeed, Müllbacher et al. (2013) find that 
it is possible to fully compensate the four lowest-income deciles in Ireland from 
such a tax increase using just 22 per cent of revenues, leaving 78 per cent – an 
estimated €1.7 billion by Revenue’s estimate – for other purposes. 
5.2  EQUALISING PRSI TREATMENT OF SELF-EMPLOYED AND 
EMPLOYEES 
Economic activity carried out via self-employment is subject to less tax than that 
carried out through employment. This is because, while income tax credits and the 
main Class A (employee) and Class S (self-employed) rates of PRSI are the same 
(4 per cent), employers are required to make PRSI contributions of between 
8.8 and 11.05 per cent on behalf of their employees. For example, Figure 5.2 shows 
that a gross employee salary of €40,000 is associated with €12,768 in tax overall: 
€5,640 in income tax, €1,108 in USC, and €6,020 in PRSI (€1,600 in employee PRSI 
and €4,420 in employer PRSI). A similar self-employment income is associated with 

























Decile of equivalised disposable income
Equalise reduced VAT rate - % income Equalise zero VAT rate - % income
Equalise reduced VAT rate - % expenditure Equalise zero VAT rate - % expenditure
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This generates a substantial gap in the total tax burden associated with each form 
of employment, which Roantree et al. (2018), NESC (2020) and Milanez and Bratta 
(2019) have argued may lead some people to operate as self-employed when they 
would otherwise be employed. While the lack of entitlement to certain 
contributory benefits has traditionally been advanced as a reason for why the self-
employed pay less PRSI than employees, recent reforms have extended eligibility 
for the vast majority of these benefits to the self-employed. The Department of 
Employment Affairs and Social Protection (2020) found that these changes mean 
that self-employed workers now have access to around 93 per cent of the 
contributory benefits that employees do, in value terms, while making much fewer 
contributions. 
 
FIGURE 5.2 TOTAL INCOME TAX, USC AND PRSI ASSOCIATED WITH ANNUAL INCOME OF €40,000 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations.   
Notes:  Assumes single individual with no income tax deductions beyond the standard personal and PAYE/Earned Income tax credit, liable 
to class A employee and employer PRSI if employed, and class S PRSI if self-employed. Employer PRSI includes National Training 
Fund Levy of 1 per cent.  
 
We estimate, using SWITCH, that increasing the rates of PRSI paid by the self-
employed to match those made on behalf of PAYE workers would raise about 
€1.150 billion in revenue. Figure 5.3 shows the distributional impact of this reform, 
with the tax rise amounting to 1.4 per cent of disposable income on average. Losses 
for those in the highest-income decile would be just over twice the figure for 
households on average, while losses for those in the lowest-half of the distribution 
















USC (€1,108) USC (€1,108) 
PRSI (€1,600) PRSI (€1,600) 
Employer PRSI 
(€4,420) Difference: €4,420 
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FIGURE 5.3 DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF EQUALISING SELF-EMPLOYED AND EMPLOYEE’S PRSI  
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using SWITCH v3.1, run on data from the 2017 Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC), updated to 
2020 terms using outturn and forecast wage growth from the ESRI and Central Bank of Ireland. 
Note: Deciles calculated on the basis of equivalised disposable income, using CSO national equivalence scales.  
 
While many self-employed are involved in ‘entrepreneurial activities’ such as 
employing others, innovating and investing, those operating as self-employed 
include everyone from taxi-drivers to IT consultants and barristers. Blanket lower 
rates of tax – including PRSI – are therefore poorly directed at encouraging 
entrepreneurship or business start-ups. Rather, as argued by Adam and Miller 
(2019), government intervention should be targeted towards areas where there is 
clear evidence that markets are failing to provide appropriate incentives such as 
research and development (where those who carry out such activities may not be 
able to capture the full reward from their innovation).  
5.3  RESTRICTING PENSION TAX SUBSIDIES  
Ireland – in common with most other advanced economies – taxes pensions under 
a regime that can be broadly characterised as ‘exempt-exempt-taxed’ (EET), 
whereby income is exempt from tax when first received and paid into a pension; 
exempt from tax as the returns accrue, and taxed when funds are withdrawn from 
the pension (Yoo and de Serres, 2004). Mirrlees et al. (2011) argue that, by 
exempting from taxation the normal return to savings, this regime comes close to 
avoiding distorting the timing of individuals’ consumption decisions towards either 
spending more now and less in the future, or vice versa. 
 
However, there are some important exceptions to this broadly EET regime in 
Ireland:  
• Employee pension contributions are (since 2011) subject to both employee 
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• Pension income drawn down in retirement is subject to the USC, but not 
(employee or employer) PRSI. 
• Individuals can draw down a large tax-free lump sum in retirement. 
• Contributions are subject to annual limits that vary with age. 
 
These exceptions mean that neither employee nor employer PRSI is ever levied on 
the overwhelming majority of employer pension contributions. This is because PRSI 
is not charged on the incomes of those above the state pension age, and only – 
since 2014 – on certain forms of unearned income. In other words, employer 
pension contributions are subject to an exempt-exempt-exempt (EEE) PRSI regime. 
The government could address this anomaly by levying PRSI on the pension income 
of those aged above the state pension age. This would have the advantage of 
harmonising the income tax and PRSI treatment of employer pension contributions 
to an EET regime, but leave employee pension contributions subject to PRSI both 
when made and when drawn down in retirement.  
 
Alternatively, since employee pension contributions are already subject to 
employer and (since 2011) employee PRSI, the Government could instead levy both 
employee and employer PRSI on employer pension contributions when they are 
made. This would amount to a tax-exempt-exempt (TEE) PRSI regime for both types 
of pension contributions, which – while inferior to an EET regime, because it leaves 
untaxed any above-normal returns – might still be preferred to the EEE PRSI regime 
currently in operation for employer contributions (Mirrlees et al., 2011). However, 
this approach could raise both intergenerational concerns (as only future 
contributions would be affected, with those who have already retired or 
accumulated substantial pension pots unaffected) and implementation issues (in 
respect of levying employee PRSI on defined benefit pensions). No official estimate 
is available for what revenue either of these approaches could yield. 
 
Substantial revenue could also be raised by restricting the size of the tax-free lump 
sum that can be withdrawn from a pension pot on retirement. This is currently 
capped at €200,000 and was estimated by Revenue to cost €134 million in 2014 
(the latest year for which data is provided).25 The tax-free lump sum is poorly 
targeted at lower to middle earners as it provides a much larger bonus for higher-
rate income tax payers in retirement than for basic-rate payers. It also encourages 
the withdrawal of large lump sums even though the primary concern of policy is, 
arguably, to encourage individuals to ensure a regular stream of income in 





25  See https://www.revenue.ie/en/corporate/documents/statistics/tax-expenditures/costs-tax-expenditures.pdf  
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The current tax-free lump sum could be replaced by alternative subsidies better 
targeted at lower-to-middle earners, including (further) reduced taxation of 
income drawn from a pension in retirement (e.g. higher personal tax credits for 
those over the state pension age), or – as suggested by O’Dea and Roantree (2018) 
in their submission to the Interdepartmental Pensions Reform and Taxation Group 
– a top-up to pension funds if and when the fund is annuitised. This latter option 
could be seen as a pension variant of the SSIA scheme introduced in 2001, and has 
the potential attraction of perhaps being more salient than increases to personal 
tax credits. It could also be easily tailored to meet a government’s preferred 
distributional aims, with, for example, contributions initially subsidised at a 
generous rate and these subsidies capped at a maximum cash amount per person 
to effectively target those with smaller pension pots. 
 
Finally, a government could raise additional revenue by reducing the lifetime or 
annual limits on what may be contributed to a pension tax-free. Reductions to the 
lifetime limit would primarily affect those with very large pension pots, given that 
the Standard Fund Threshold is currently set at €2 million – down from the level of 
€5 million that applied until 2005. Such reductions might be preferred on the 
grounds of simplicity to those in annual contribution limits, which are already 
complicated by age-related restrictions that are difficult to justify. Consider two 
individuals with the same level of lifetime earnings, which are concentrated at 
different points in life; it is not clear why someone whose earnings peak earlier in 
life should be discouraged from making the same level of contributions to a 
pension as someone whose earnings peak much later in life. Again, unfortunately, 
no official estimate is currently available on the cost of these reliefs.  
5.4  CAPITAL GAINS TAX (CGT) RELIEFS 
Principal Private Residence (PPR) relief 
(PPR relief exempts from CGT any gains made on the disposal of property which 
was for the whole period the seller’s main residence and used solely as their home. 
Partial relief applies in cases where the property was only for some period the 
seller’s main residence or if part of it was used for business purposes. 
 
While Revenue no longer publishes estimates of the cost of this relief, the 
Commission on Taxation (Daly et al., 2009) cites a figure of €2.4 billion from 47,340 
cases in 2006. This amounts to an average of €51,500 in relief per case, implying 
an average taxable gain of €156,000. The exemption of PPRs from CGT creates a 
strong bias to save in the form of owner-occupied housing, with research 
unsurprisingly finding that such exemptions contribute to higher house prices 
(Hendershott et al., 2020). The relief also creates a distortion towards living in a 
residential property since, while income from rent is subject to income tax, that 
from selling owner-occupied housing is tax-free. 
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However, imposing CGT on PPRs could – as with any asset – generate a ‘lock-in’ 
effect, with people discouraged from selling a residence whose value had risen, 
due to profits realised from the sale being subject to tax. This effect could be 
exacerbated if people believed that the policy could be reversed in the future 
(Adam and Roantree, 2015). Mirrlees (2011, pp.395-403) proposed addressing this 
issue by introducing a recurrent tax on the imputed rent from owner-occupied 
housing at a homeowner’s marginal income tax rate and providing a rate-of-return 
allowance, as discussed in Section 4.3, that would include residential property. This 
would in fact lead to some refunds at the point that properties are sold and 
neutralise the potential for ‘lock-in’ effects to undermine the long-run viability of 
the tax. While removing this relief would need to form part of a wider and radical 
reform of housing taxation, it would provide a means of raising substantial 
revenues while reducing the bias towards home ownership embedded in the tax 
system. 
Entrepreneur relief 
Entrepreneur relief is a reduced CGT rate of 10 per cent that applies to chargeable 
gains – up to a lifetime limit – on certain eligible assets. Foremost among these are 
assets owned by a trading company (or holding company of a trading group) of 
which the shareholder has been a full-time employee or director and who has 
owned at least 5 per cent of the shares for a continuous period of three years in 
the five years immediately prior to disposal. The office of the Revenue 
Commissioners estimates that 875 taxpayers availed of the relief in 2018 (the latest 
year for which data is available) at a cost of €92.4 million, significantly more than 
the €27 million per year anticipated when the measure was introduced.26 This 
implies an average cost of more than €100,000 per claimant, with almost 200 
claims for more than €1 million of relief.  
 
As argued by Roantree and Miller (2019), entrepreneur relief creates an array of 
economic distortions. First, it provides a strong incentive to set up a business in 
which to retain profits, putting pressure on anti-avoidance rules which attempt to 
define when companies are ‘artificial’ avoidance devices. Second, it gives 
companies an artificial incentive to ensure that any individual employee’s 
shareholdings are above an arbitrary 5 per cent threshold. Third, it encourages 
owner-managers of companies to retain profits in the company rather than take 
them out as dividends or salary, and self-employed individuals and partnerships to 
retain business assets until they are ready to stop doing business altogether. 
Entrepreneur relief creates these incentives regardless of whether – in the absence 
of tax considerations – business owners would rather spend their money sooner or 
could invest it more profitably elsewhere, or whether assets could be more 




26  See https://www.revenue.ie/en/corporate/information-about-revenue/statistics/tax-expenditures/entrepreneur-
relief-statistics.aspx and http://www.budget.gov.ie/budgets/2016  
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(2010) suggest are already poor levels of management practices among domestic 
firms in Ireland by discouraging the disposal of business assets to those who could 
manage them better.  
 
The justification for applying lower tax rates to people who own their own business 
than to the rest of the population is far from clear. Preferential capital gains rates 
are often defended as essential to reward difficult and risky entrepreneurial 
activity. But the difficulty and risk associated with entrepreneurship do not in 
themselves justify favourable tax treatment as these are typically rewarded 
through a higher pre-tax return. What is needed (though not sufficient) to justify 
the existence of entrepreneur relief is some rationale as to why the market will 
lead to too few entrepreneurs when the tax system is neutral between legal forms 
(Adam and Miller, 2021). A good example of this is there being insufficient 
investment in research and development (R&D) because innovators do not reap 
sufficient rewards from their innovation, with some spilling over to other 
businesses that can learn from the experiences of the innovator. This provides a 
good rationale for policies such as the R&D tax credit, which a Department of 
Finance (2016) evaluation found was a reasonably effective if expensive way of 
stimulating R&D activity by private firms. 
 
However, there is little evidence to suggest that reduced rates of CGT are well 
targeted at alleviating any concerns around business start-ups, or that those who 
qualify for entrepreneur relief carry out activities associated with large spillovers. 
Indeed, evidence from the UK shows that few entrepreneurs who availed of a 
similar relief there knew of its existence when starting their business, and even 
fewer reported it having influenced the timing or nature of their disposal (HMRC, 
2017). This suggests that the relief is more likely to generate efforts to avoid tax on 
retirement than its intended purpose of spurring entrepreneurship or investment 
– something that Miller et al. (2019) find good evidence to support. Indeed, this 
evidence was cited by the British Treasury in its decision to restrict the similarly 
designed relief in that jurisdiction, now called Business Asset Disposal (BAD) relief. 
This move by the British government may provide more scope than previously 
available for a future tax-raising Irish government to follow suit, alongside a more 
comprehensive review of the incentives provided for start-ups and whether they 
are achieving their stated aims. 
Other CGT reliefs 
A number of other reliefs with questionable targeting or economic rationales apply 
to CGT. At present, no CGT is levied on assets transferred at death. Instead, such 
assets are treated as being acquired at their market value by the beneficiary at the 
date of the original owner’s death if and when the beneficiary comes to dispose of 
them. While such treatment is sometimes supported on the grounds that it 
prevents the double taxation of bequests that are subject to CAT (e.g. Commission 
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on Taxation, 2009), there also exists a CAT credit available to beneficiaries for CGT 
paid by disponers on certain assets.27 In any case, Adam et al. (2013) point out that 
double taxation is inherent to the taxation of wealth transfers, with CGT designed 
to serve an entirely different purpose (the taxation of the returns to saving) and no 
equivalent relief for income tax already paid on gifts or bequests. Exempting assets 
transferred at death from CGT creates an extremely strong incentive for older 
individuals to hold on to assets, such as investment properties, until death in order 
to bequest them tax-free to children, potentially contributing to lower levels of 
living standards and higher rates of poverty through retirement (Beirne et al., 
2020).  
 
Another questionably targeted relief is that applying to the transfer or disposal of 
certain business or farming assets by individuals aged 55+. Although termed CGT 
Retirement Relief, this does not in fact require an individual to retire from the 
business or farming, but simply dispose of or transfer beneficial ownership of the 
assets.28 A limit of €3 million for full relief applies on disposals or transfers to 
children or certain other close relations if made after the age of 66, while no limit 
applies to those made between the age of 55 and 66. Similarly, a lower limit of 
€500,000 applies to transfers or disposals made to third parties after the age of 66, 
with earlier such transfers or disposals subject to a higher limit of €700,000. Partial 
relief applies to transfers or disposals above these thresholds. The stated rationale 
for this relief is to support succession in small family businesses and farms, but also 
to encourage the transfer of small businesses and farms to new non-family owners 
(Commission on Taxation, 2009, pp.288-289). However, the relief also further 
advantages the already favourable tax treatment of income taken in the form of 
capital gains compared to that from employment, with the associated 
consequences for equity and economic efficiency discussed in Section 4.3.   
 
A final significant (and economically dubious) relief from CGT is that given to 
property acquired between 7 December 2011 and 31 December 2014. Any gains in 
respect of land or buildings in any European Economic Area state acquired 
between these dates are exempt from CGT provided they were held for at least 
four and up to seven years continuously, and were sold on or after 1 January 2018. 
Partial relief is available on property held for more than seven years, at a rate given 
by dividing seven by the number of years the property has been continuously 
owned. For example, an investment property bought for €100,000 in 2012 and sold 
for €400,000 in 2018 would be entirely exempt from CGT but attract a liability of 
€97,730 if bought in November 2011 (abstracting from any allowable expenses 
such as solicitor’s fees and improvements). While the stated rationale for this relief 




27  See https://www.revenue.ie/en/gains-gifts-and-inheritance/credits-you-can-claim-against-cat/credit-for-capital-
gains-tax-cgt.aspx  
28  The former owner can continue to work on the farm or for the business as an employee or consultant. 
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development and property sectors’,29 it is difficult to see why doing so would 
require completely exempting capital gains experienced by investors for a period 
of seven years. Given that the CSO’s Residential Property Price Index has increased 
by 75 per cent nationally since 2013 (an annualised growth rate in excess of 8 per 
cent per year), it is likely that most investors have made substantial windfall gains 
in addition to any rental income they received from the asset. The office of the 
Revenue Commissioners estimates that only 632 taxpayers took advantage of the 
relief in 2018 (the latest year for which data is available), at a cost of €113 million.30 
 
Unfortunately, no official costings are available as to what abolishing or restricting 
the rest of these reliefs might raise. However, statistics from Revenue show there 
were more than 1,400 beneficiaries of CGT retirement relief in 2018, while stamp-
duty returns provided by the CSO show that 4,411 residential properties were 
bought by non-owner occupiers for a combined €600 million between 2012 and 
2014.31 These figures give some sense of the scale of revenues that might be 
available to a future government that wanted to raise taxes by restricting some of 
the more questionably targeted CGT reliefs in operation today.  
5.5  CAPITAL ACQUISITIONS TAX (CAT) BUSINESS AND AGRICULTURAL 
RELIEF 
In addition to annual and lifetime CAT-free allowances, individuals who inherit or 
receive a gift of certain business or agricultural assets can avail of Business or 
Agricultural CAT Relief.32 This reduces the taxable value of eligible assets by 90 per 
cent, which – combined with the lifetime allowance of €335,000 – means that a 
business or farm worth up to €3.35 million can be gifted or bequeathed by a parent 
to a child without giving rise to any CAT liability. Similarly, a business or farm worth 
up to €10.05 million can be gifted or bequeathed entirely CAT-free by a parent of 
three children to those children if given in equal shares.  
 
The stated rationale for these reliefs is – as with CGT retirement relief – to support 
the growth of and succession within small family farms and businesses 
(Department of Finance, 2018, 2014). However, Revenue statistics show that in 
2019 there were 648 claims for Business Relief at a cost of €200.4 million and 1,413 
claims for Agricultural Relief at a cost of €158.6 million: an average cost per claim 
of €309,259 and €112,243 respectively.33 This suggests that the primary 




29  See http://www.budget.gov.ie/budgets/2012/FinancialStatement.aspx  
30  See https://www.revenue.ie/en/corporate/documents/statistics/tax-expenditures/costs-tax-expenditures.pdf 
31  See https://www.revenue.ie/en/corporate/documents/statistics/tax-expenditures/costs-tax-expenditures.pdf and 
CSO series HPA02 (Residential Dwelling Property Transactions) respectively.  
32  See https://www.revenue.ie/en/gains-gifts-and-inheritance/cat-reliefs/business-relief/index.aspx and 
https://www.revenue.ie/en/gains-gifts-and-inheritance/cat-reliefs/agricultural-relief/index.aspx for full details, 
including what types of assets are eligible. 
33  See https://www.revenue.ie/en/corporate/documents/statistics/tax-expenditures/costs-tax-expenditures.pdf 
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gifted small family farms or businesses, but far more substantial ones. 
Furthermore, given that there is strong evidence that inherited family-owned and 
-run firms are, on average, very poorly managed (Bloom and van Reenan, 2010), 
the goal of supporting the growth of and succession within family businesses 
should be weighed against the wider economic costs of discouraging the disposal 
of business assets to third parties. 
 
Citing excess generosity to those inheriting larger farms and businesses, the 
Commission on Taxation (2009) recommended reducing the rate of both reliefs to 
no more than 75 per cent, with a cap of €3 million on eligible assets. While no 
costing is available for what capping the relief would raise, Revenue (2020) 
estimate that almost €60 million would be raised by reducing both reliefs to 70 per 
cent and €135 million by reducing both to 50 per cent.  
5.6  HELP TO BUY  
Help to Buy (HTB) provides a refund of income tax and Deposit Interest Retention 
Tax (DIRT) paid in the previous four years to first-time owner-occupiers taking out 
a mortgage to self-build or buy a new-build residential property. Introduced as a 
temporary measure in 2016 with an estimated cost of €130 million over 2.5 years, 
the relief has been expanded and repeatedly extended, capped at the smallest of 
10 per cent of the purchase price/completion value, the amount of income tax and 
DIRT paid in the last four years, or €30,000. Revenue statistics show that 23,149 
claims for HTB had been made by the end of 2020, with an estimated cost of 
€370 million – almost three times the originally anticipated amount.34  
 
The Department of Finance (2019c) estimates that HTB costs approximately €100 
million per year. While restricting or abolishing the scheme might reduce the 
affordability of new-build homes for some first-time buyers, Revenue statistics 
show that more than half of claims were for properties valued at more than 
€300,000 (the median price paid for a new-build home by first-time buyers in 2017) 
and that 40 per cent had a loan-to-value of less than 85 per cent.35 That so many 
claimants are purchasing more-expensive-than-average properties and already 
had the required minimum 10 per cent deposit suggests that the scheme is poorly 
targeted towards its stated aim of providing support to first-time buyers of new-
build homes in meeting their deposit requirement.36  
 
This suggestion is reinforced by Figure 5.4, which shows claims for HTB in 2020 as 




34  See https://www.revenue.ie/en/corporate/documents/statistics/tax-expenditures/help-to-buy-annual-report-
2020.pdf 
35  Median property price from CSO series HPA02 (Residential Dwelling Property Transactions). 
36  See https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/question/2016-11-29/282/speech/629/  
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the Midlands, amounting to more than 50 per cent in Meath and 47 per cent in 
Kildare. However, claims for HTB represent less than 20 per cent of new dwelling 
completions in Dublin, where issues of affordability for first-time buyers are most 
acute and supply constraints greatest (Morgenroth, 2016).  
 
This suggests that, to the extent that HTB has stimulated construction activity, it 
has done so in areas where supply constraints are least rather than where demand 
is greatest – as what Carozzi et al. (2020) argue was the effect of the UK’s Help-to-
Buy equity loan scheme.37 Restricting the scheme may therefore have limited 
effects on the first-time buyers and self-builders it is supposed to help.  
5.7  ELIMINATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL TAX RELIEFS 
The CSO estimates that fossil-fuel subsidies amounted to €2.4 billion in 2019, with 
the majority (89 per cent) of these accounted for by tax reliefs.38 Restricting these 
tax reliefs could generate a significant amount of revenue while simultaneously 
promoting environmental objectives. The CSO estimates that the largest of these 
reliefs was the exemption from excise and carbon taxes of jet kerosene used for 
commercial flights, costing €634 million per year, while lower rates of excise duty 
on autodiesel than petrol cost €400 million per year. 
 
De Bruin et al. (2019) show that Ireland has the second highest level of fossil-fuel 
subsidies among OECD countries. They find that removing these subsidies (other 
than means-tested allowances for electricity, gas and fuel) would have small 
impacts on average household disposable income, with higher-income households 
more affected than lower-income households. However, as with excise duty 
increases, to the extent that policy is successful in reducing the use of fossil fuels, 





37  Carozzi et al. (2020) also showed that the UK’s Help-to-Buy equity loan scheme resulted in higher new-build prices, 
with no effect on construction volumes in the supply-constrained Greater London Area, benefiting existing landowners 
and housing developers rather than first-time buyers as intended. 
38  See https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/ffes/fossilfuelsubsidies2019/ 
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FIGURE 5.4  HELP-TO-BUY CLAIMS AS A PERCENTAGE OF NEW DWELLING COMPLETIONS, 2020 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using statistics on Help to Buy claims from Office of the Revenue Commissioners and on New Dwelling 
Completions from the CSO. 







Even before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, an ageing population, 
commitments to future spending increases, overreliance on corporation tax 
receipts from a small number of companies and an inevitable decline in motor tax 
revenues combined to make likely the need for future tax rises. This paper has 
examined a range of options that a future government seeking to raise or replace 
tax revenues might consider, highlighting the potential distributional impact of 
such policies and the possible economic effects.  
 
Table 6.1 summarises these options, setting out the estimated revenue that could 
be raised from each. Figure 6.1 provides a means of comparing the distributional 
impact of these tax increases where estimates are available, showing the share of 
revenue paid by each decile as well as their share of total income and expenditure. 
Measures that raise more than that decile’s share of total income (spending) can 
be classified as progressive with respect to income (spending), while those that 
raise less can be classified as regressive with respect to income (spending). 
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TABLE 6.1  REVENUE YIELD OF POSSIBLE TAX RISES 
Measure Section Revenue raised (€ million) 
Income tax and USCs 3.1  
Increase standard rate of income tax by 1 ppt  664 
Increase higher rate of income tax by 1ppt  319 
Increase 0.5% rate of USC by 1 ppt  272 
Increase 2% rate of USC by 1 ppt  203 
Increase 4.5% rate of USC by 1 ppt  376 
Increase 8% rate of USC by 1 ppt  160 
PRSI 3.2  
Increase Class A employee PRSI rate by 1 ppta  700 
Increase Class A employer PRSI rate by 1 pptb  850 
Increase Class S self-employed PRSI rate by 1 ppta  110 
VAT 3.3  
Increase standard rate of VAT by 1 ppt  440 
Increase reduced rates of VAT by 1 ppt  250 
Excise duties 3.4  
Increase alcohol excise duties by 10%  225 
Increase tobacco excise duties by 10%  80 
Increase fuel excise duties by 5%  84 
Increase carbon tax by 10%  138 
Local property tax 3.6  
Update values for all propertiesc  275 
Increase all local property tax rates by 15%c  72 
Increase top rates of USC 4.1  
Increase 1% USC surcharge for self-employed income above €100,000  14 
Introduce new 3% USC surcharge on PAYE income above €100,000   110 
Increase income tax rates on higher earners 4.2  
Introduce a new tax rate of 43% for income above €100,000  315 
Capital gains tax 4.3  
Increase rate of CGT by 1 ppt  33 
Capital acquisitions tax 4.4  
Increase CAT rate by 1 ppt  13 
Reduce Group’s A threshold to €250,000   63 
Reduce Group’s B threshold to €25,000  20 
Reduce Group’s C threshold to €13,000  3 
Wealth tax 4.5  
Introduce wealth tax rate of 1% for wealth above €1m with exemptionsd  53 
Introduce wealth tax rate of 1% for wealth above €1m without exemptionsd  248 
Introduce wealth tax rate of 1% for wealth above €125,000 with exemptionsd  329 
Standardize the VAT rates 5.1  
Increase zero rate of VAT to standard VAT rate  2,200 
Increase reduced rate of VAT to standard VAT rate  2,400 
Equalise PRSI treatment 5.2  
Equalise self-employed PRSI treatment to employeesa  1,150 
  Contd. 
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TABLE 6.1  CONTD. 
 
Source: Revenue’s Ready Reckoner (2020) (unless stated otherwise). 
Note: a.  Authors’ calculation’s using SWITCH v. 3.1.    
b.  Department of Finance (2020), Political Party Costings – Pre Budget 2021, Labour Party Costings, available at 
https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/fc14f-political-party-costings-pre-budget-2021/    
c.  Department of Finance (2019a).  
d.  Lawless and Lynch (2018).  
e.  Revenue (2014), available at https://www.revenue.ie/en/corporate/documents/statistics/tax-expenditures/costs-tax-
expenditures.pdf.  
f.  Commission of Taxation (2009).  
g.  Revenue, see https://www.revenue.ie/en/corporate/information-about-revenue/statistics/tax-expenditures/entrepreneur-
relief-statistics.aspx  
h.  Department of Finance (2019c). CSO, available at 
https://www.cso.ie/en/csolatestnews/pressreleases/2021pressreleases/pressstatementfossilfuelsubsidies2019/. 
 
Measure Section Revenue raised (€ million) 
Restrict pension tax subsidies 5.3  
Cost of tax-free pension lump sume  134 
Capital gains tax reliefs 5.4  
Cost of CGT Principal Private Residence Relieff  2,400 
Cost of CGT Entrepreneur Reliefg  92 
Cost of CGT relief under section 604Ag  113 
Capital acquisitions tax reliefs 5.5  
Cost of CAT Business Reliefg  200 
Cost of CAT Agricultural Reliefg   159 
Reduce CAT Business and Agricultural Relief to 70%  60 
Reduce CAT Business and Agricultural Relief to 50%  135 
Help to Buy 5.6  
Cost of Help to Buy schemeh  100 
Environmental Tax Reliefs 5.7  
Cost of environmental tax reliefsi  2,400 
Cost of jet kerosene’s exemption from excise and carbon taxesj    634 
Standardising excise duty on autodiesel with petrolj  400 
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FIGURE 6.1 DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF POSSIBLE TAX RISES 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using SWITCH v3.1 run on data from the 2017 Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC), updated to 
2020 terms using outturn and forecast wage growth from the ESRI and Central Bank of Ireland for the estimations about the 
share of income, the income tax, USC and PRSI. Authors’ calculations using the 2015-2016 Household Budget Survey for the 
estimations about the share of expenditure, VAT and excise duties. 
 
It is clear from Figure 6.1 that the majority of revenue from almost all the tax 
increases considered would come from those in higher income deciles. This in part 
reflects the unequal distribution of income and spending across the population, 
with, for example, 22.4 per cent of total income and 16.6 of total spending 
associated with the very highest income decile. However, it also reflects the fact 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Share of income
Share of expenditure
Income tax: increase standard rate
Income tax: increase higher rate
USC: increase 0.5% rate
USC: increase  2% rate
USC: increase 4.5% rate
USC: increase 8% rate
PRSI: increase employee rate
PRSI: increase self-employed rate
VAT: increase main rate
VAT: increase reduced rate
Increase alcohol excise duties
Increase tobacco excise duties
Increase fuel excise duties
Increase carbon tax
Increase USC 3% surcharge for the self employed
Introduce USC 3% surcharge for PAYE
Introduce 43% income tax rate
VAT: equalise zero rate with main rate
VAT: equalise reduced rate with main rate
Equalise self-employed and employee's PRSI
Lowest 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Highest
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that taxes on personal income are levied on a progressive basis, with most levied 
only above a certain threshold(s). As a result, increases to even broad-based taxes 
like the standard rate of income tax raise can be considered broadly progressive,  
 
While there are many ways of further focusing revenue increases on the ‘better-
off’, the options we have considered would struggle to raise substantial amounts 
of revenue without being levied at very high rates. Furthermore, there is good 
evidence to suggest that better-off taxpayers – particularly the self-employed and 
company owner-managers – are especially responsive to taxes. This raises 
considerable uncertainty around how much extra tax such increased rates might 
raise relative to the estimates provided here.  
 
However, the evidence also shows that the reason these better-off taxpayers are 
more responsive is because of the greater opportunities they have to avoid taxes. 
It might therefore be possible to raise more substantial revenue from the better-
off if higher rates were accompanied by restrictions to some of the reliefs and 
exemptions that apply to existing taxes – to CGT and CAT in particular. Restricting 
some of the less well targeted reliefs and exemptions that apply to these taxes 
could not only contribute to raising significant sums of tax revenue but also result 
in a simpler, more efficient (and arguably fairer) tax system. Similarly, eliminating 
some of the fossil-fuel tax reliefs could generate a significant amount of revenue 
while simultaneously promoting a cleaner environment. 
 
A recurring issue highlighted throughout the paper is the large number of 
anomalies in the current tax system. These find expression in reliefs and 
exemptions, as well as in the differential tax treatment of income based on its 
source. Increasing tax rates while keeping the tax base unchanged would amplify 
the distortions these create. There is, therefore, a good case for a government 
seeking to raise taxation to also address these anomalies as part of a wider reform 
of taxation. 
 
Nevertheless, the most straightforward way of raising substantial tax revenue is 
through increases to the main rates of income tax, the USC, PRSI, VAT and the LPT. 
Even small increases to any of these broad-based taxes could generate 
considerable revenue, precisely because they affect almost all households. Such 
tax rises can also be designed to meet a range of distributional objectives, with 
increases to higher rates of income tax and the USC the most progressive, and 
increases to the main and reduced rates of VAT the least progressive. 
 
However, the distributional objectives of governments are not limited to income. 
Roantree et al. (2021) show that Ireland – like the United States and Britain – is 
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experiencing growing inequality across generations, with younger adults hit 
hardest in the labour market by both the financial crisis and the pandemic. Future 
governments seeking to address this growing inequality may wish to focus tax 
increases on other age groups. From this perspective, increases in the LPT, taxes 
on pension income and the restrictions to pension tax subsidies we discuss are all 
relatively well targeted at those from previous generations who have benefited 
most from strong growth in earnings and house prices in recent decades. 
 
Ultimately the decision of how much to raise taxes and which taxes to raise is a 
political decision that a future government must take by balancing the impact of 
tax increases on factors such as the incentives to work and invest with other goals 
like equity and simplicity. But the likely need for significant tax increases also 
provides an opportunity to reassess how effective various parts of the tax system 
are at achieving their objectives. Doing so could result in a tax system that not only 
raises the revenue necessary to finance desired levels of public spending in the 
years ahead, but that is better designed to meet the challenges of the coming 
decades. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
The results presented in this paper are derived from SWITCH, the ESRI’s direct tax 
and benefit microsimulation model, and ITsim, an indirect tax microsimulation 
model jointly developed by researchers at the ESRI and the Department of Finance. 
 
ITsim estimates the indirect taxes (VAT and excise duties, including carbon taxes) 
paid by Irish households on the basis of their reported expenditure, collected by 
the CSO’s nationally representative Household Budget Survey (HBS). This is 
conducted every five years, with respondents asked to keep a diary of their 
expenditures over a two-week period, but the survey also contains information on 
less frequent expenditure items, such as insurance and durable goods. We use data 
from the latest edition of the HBS (conducted between February 2015 and 2016), 
uprating incomes and expenditures to 2020 terms using official statistics. Our 
model categorises which rates of VAT and excise duty each expenditure item is 
subject to, with the carbon content of fuels taken from official estimates. We then 
apply the 2020 rates of VAT39 and excise duties to these uprated quantities to 
estimate the amount of indirect taxes paid by each household, and – holding 
quantities of goods and services purchased constant – how much indirect taxes 
they would pay if the rates were increased.  
 
While the HBS also collects information on income, it does not do so to the level of 
detail required to determine the direct tax liabilities and benefit entitlements of 
households. To estimate the impact that possible direct tax and PRSI increases 
would have on different income groups, we use SWITCH. This simulates the direct 
tax liabilities and social welfare entitlements of the Irish population using the 
nationally representative SILC. SILC is an annual household survey conducted by 
the CSO that collects detailed information on individuals’ incomes, along with 
detailed demographic information. We uprate these quantities to 2020 terms in 
the same way as those in the HBS, without taking into account the COVID-19 effect, 
then use SWITCH to simulate the net change in household disposable income for 
each of the reforms examined in the paper. 
 
Both sets of estimates assume that households’ behaviour remains unchanged in 
response to a change in relative prices of goods/services and labour/leisure for the 
HBS- and SILC-derived estimates respectively. This means the results are best 




39  For the main VAT rate we used the rate applied before COVID-19, as the lower main rate of VAT was a temporary 
measure.  
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